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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3) (j). The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals by Order dated 
April 4, 1994. 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is: 
In light of the record in this case, did the trial court 
commit reversible error in ruling that Living Scriptures, Inc. 
("LSI") did not intentionally waive its right to insist on 
compliance with the payment terms of the Lease and the Memorandum 
and that LSI did not engage in conduct that would estop LSI from 
insisting on that right? 
Waiver and estoppel are "highly fact-dependent" questions, 
which involve the application of broad legal standards to specific 
facts. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). As such, 
their determination is one that an appellate court "cannot 
profitably review de novo." Id. Rather, in reviewing a trial 
court's ruling in this area, the appellate court must accord that 
ruling with "a measure of discretion." Id. at 939. 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules, or regulations that are determinative of the issue on 
appeal. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
LSI brought this action against Appellant MichaelJohn Kudlik 
("Kudlik") because of Kudlik's numerous breaches of the Lease and 
the Memorandum and to recover unpaid rent, interest thereon, 
attorney's fees and costs, treble damages for unlawful detainer, 
and possession of a certain building and property located at 3685 
Harrison Boulevard, Ogden, Utah (the "Premises"). (R. 1-26.) 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court. 
LSI filed its Complaint and a three-day Summons on August 27, 
1993. On September 2, 1993, Judge West entered an Order Regarding 
Possession Bond. (R. at 93.) That same day, and again on 
September 4, 1993, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice of Filing of 
Possession Bond and of Remedies Available to Defendant in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 6-8.5. (Id. at 94.) Kudlik 
requested a hearing within three days after service. (Id.) 
Judge West held a hearing on the possession bond issue on 
September 8, 1993. Pursuant to that hearing, Judge West entered an 
Order Regarding Restitution dated September 13, 1993, directing 
Kudlik to pay the past-due rent, late fees, interest, and attorneys 
fees owing in order to maintain possession of the Premises pending 
a further hearing. (R. at 66-69, 94.) Kudlik did not comply with 
the terms of that Order. 
On September 20, 1993, Judge West held a hearing on the two 
issues submitted by the parties, namely, to determine the 
2 
reasonableness of LSI's attorney's fees and to determine if LSI had 
waived or would be estopped from requiring timely performance from 
Kudlik based on Kudlik7s having made four rental payments late. 
(Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 2-3.) At that hearing, Judge 
West determined that LSI's attorney's fees were reasonable, (id. at 
36-37) , that LSI had not waived its right to timely performance 
under the Lease or the Memorandum and that there was no basis for 
estoppel against LSI, (id. at 32-33; R. at 95) , and that Kudlik had 
been in unlawful detainer of the Premises since August 27, 1993.1 
(Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 33; R. at 95.) Accordingly, 
Judge West entered an Order of Restitution directing Kudlik to 
restore possession of the Premises to LSI, (R. at 81-82), and 
ordered Kudlik to pay the past-due rent, treble rent from August 
27, 1993 to the date of the hearing, LSI's attorney's fees and 
costs, and post-judgment interest. (R. at 98.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On or about June 26, 1985, Myrtle M. Crouch, as landlord, and 
Jay Anderson and Dale Minson, as tenants, entered into a certain 
1
 Contrary to Kudlik's assertion in his brief, Judge West did 
not find that LSI had "tolerated x. . . a pattern of payments that 
were not being made.7" Brief of Appellant at 4. Rather, Judge 
West found that, prior to January 25, 1993, Kudlik had slipped into 
a pattern of making late payments, which caused LSI and Kudlik to 
enter into a Memorandum of Understanding that established a payment 
schedule for past-due payments and that required strict compliance 
by Kudlik with the payment terms of Lease between the parties 
thereafter. (Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 32.) Judge 
West's statement does not support Kudlik's new-founded assertion. 
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Lease agreement (the "Lease") concerning the Premises.2 (R. 92.) 
All right, title, and interest of Myrtle M. Crouch under the Lease 
and in and to the Premises was transferred and assigned to LSI. 
(Id.) The interest and obligations of Jay Anderson and Dale Minson 
as tenants under the Lease were assigned to Kudlik. (Id.) Kudlik 
is obligated to make all payments to LSI that were to be made as a 
tenant under the Lease, including all rents during the term of the 
Lease. (Id.) Kudlik is also obligated to perform all of the 
covenants and obligations of a tenant under the Lease. (Id.) 
By February of 1993, Kudlik had failed to pay 1991 and 1992 
real property taxes, as required by the Lease, and was two months 
arrears in rent. (Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7; Tr. of 
September 20, 1993 Hearing at 3, 23; Exhibit P-2 to September 20, 
1993 Hearing, Memorandum of Understanding, R. 169, 182-84.) LSI 
contacted its attorney, who notified Kudlik that he was in default 
under the Lease. (Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 6-7; Tr. of 
September 20, 1993 Hearing at 23.) To assist Kudlik in curing his 
defaults under the Lease, LSI and Kudlik entered into a Memorandum 
of Understanding dated as of January 25, 1993 (the "Memorandum") 
pursuant to which, among other things, Kudlik agreed to cure 
existing defaults by making payments according to a specified 
payment schedule and to thereafter make timely payments under the 
2
 The Lease is included as Exhibit "A" to the Appendix 
hereto. 
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Lease.3 (R. 92; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7; Tr. of 
September 20, 1993 Hearing at 23.) With regard to the timeliness 
of payments required under the Lease, Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum 
provides, in relevant part: 
Any payment hereunder or under the Lease which is not 
received by LSI on or before its due date shall not be 
timely made and shall constitute a breach, . . . Kudlik 
hereby expressly waives any defense, offset, recoupment, 
reduction and/or counterclaim and any right of defense, 
offset, recoupment, reduction and/or counterclaim for or on 
account of any reason or event whatsoever to any liability 
of Kudlik under this Agreement and/or the Lease. 
(R. 182 f 1 (emphasis added).) Similarly, Paragraph 2 of the 
Memorandum provides, in relevant part: 
Kudlik shall make all other payments which are or become 
owed under the Lease in full and on time. 
fid, at 1 2 (emphasis added).)4 
The Memorandum also specifies that upon any default by Kudlik, 
LSI is entitled to immediately terminate the Lease and all of 
Kudlik's rights thereunder. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum 
provides: 
In the event that Kudlik fails to timely make any payment 
in full as due under this Agreement or the Lease or is 
otherwise in breach or default under the Lease, LSI may, 
without any notice to Kudlik and in addition to any other 
rights and remedies available to LSI under this Agreement, 
under the Lease, in equity or at law, immediately terminate 
3
 The Memorandum is included as Exhibit "B" to the Appendix 
hereto. 
4
 The Lease provides that "[m]onthly lease payments shall be 
paid in advance and shall commence on the effective date of this 
Lease." (Lease § III, at 3.) The Lease also provides that "[t]ime 
is of the essence of this Lease." (Id. § XV, at 6.) 
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the Lease and all of Kudlik's and his predecessors' rights 
thereunder. Any such termination shall be effective upon 
a declaration by LSI to that effect or upon LSI/s sending 
to Kudlik a notice to that effect. 
(Id, at 5 3.) 
Moreover, pursuant to the Memorandum, LSI and Kudlik agreed 
that any waiver by either party of any breach was not to be 
construed as a continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent 
breach by the other party. Accordingly, Paragraph 4.d. of the 
Memorandum provides: 
Any waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any kind or 
character whatsoever by any other party, whether such 
waiver be direct or implied, shall not be construed as a 
continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent breach 
of this Agreement on the part of the other party. 
(Id. at f 4.d.) 
Kudlik made the past-due tax and rental payments according to 
the payment schedule in the Memorandum. (Exhibit P-6 to September 
20, 1993 Hearing, R. 169, 197.) Soon thereafter, however, Kudlik 
once again fell in arrears by being delinquent in making his March, 
April, and May 1993 rent payments. (R. 197.) During that time, 
LSI had continually "bird dogged" Kudlik to make his payments. 
(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7.) In late July of 1993, 
when it became clear to LSI that its efforts to get Kudlik to make 
his rental payments on time had been unsuccessful, LSI once again 
contacted its attorney. (Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8; 
Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 25.) 
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On August 2, and again on August 3, 1993, LSI's attorney 
contacted Kudlik and informed him that LSI continued to insist on 
strict performance with the terms of the Lease and the Memorandum. 
Specifically, LSI's attorney demanded that Kudlik immediately pay 
all past due amounts in full, that he make all future payments on 
time when due, and that he pay $2 00.00 in attorney's fees pursuant 
to Section X of the Lease and Paragraph 4.g. of the Memorandum. 
(R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8; Tr. of September 
20, 1993 Hearing at 25.) LSI's attorney informed Kudlik that if he 
did not cure the existing defaults and thereafter make payments on 
time, LSI would pursue its eviction remedies. (R. 93; Tr. of 
September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8; Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing 
at 25.) 
Kudlik told LSI's attorney that he would call him back to 
discuss the matter further. (Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 
7-8; Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 25-26.) Kudlik never 
called back. (Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8; Tr. of 
September 20, 1993 Hearing at 25-26.) 
On or about August 19, 1993, Kudlik paid the June 1993 rent 
(but not the July and August 1993 rent) to Escrow Specialists. (R. 
197) The next day, upon learning of Kudlik's failure to pay the 
July 1993 and August 1993 rent, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice to 
Quit by certified mail in full compliance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-36-3 and -6. (R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8; Tr. 
of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 26; Exhibit P-3 to September 20, 
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1993 Hearing, R. 169, 185.) On August 23, 1993, LSI served Kudlik 
with a second Notice to Quit by hand delivery and by United States 
mail. (R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8; Exhibit P-4 
to September 20, 1993 Hearing, R. 169, 186.) By these Notices to 
Quit, LSI was, among other things, demanding payment of all past-
due rent. 
Kudlik failed to pay the amounts due or to vacate and quit the 
Premises. (R. 93.) On August 27, 1993, LSI filed its Complaint in 
this action. (Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8.) Thereafter, 
on or about September 2, 1993, Judge West entered an Order 
Regarding Possession Bond. (R. at 93.) That same day, and again 
on September 4, 1993, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice of Filing of 
Possession Bond and of Remedies Available to Defendant in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5. (Id. at 94.) Kudlik 
requested a hearing within three days after service. (Id.) 
On or about September 3, 1993, Kudlik filed a written Tender of 
Performance to Plaintiff. (Id. at 39-40.) LSI objected to the 
purported "tender" on the grounds, inter alia, that it is not a 
remedy or right available to Kudlik under Utah's unlawful detainer 
statute and that it did not include an amount for the September 
rent then due, the accrued interest on the past-due amounts, and 
the attorney's fees and costs owed under the Lease and the 
Memorandum. (Id. at 48-51.) 
Judge West held a hearing on the possession bond issue on 
September 8, 1993. At that hearing, LSI's attorney learned for the 
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first time that Kudlik had delivered a check the preceding Friday, 
September 3, 1993, to Escrow Specialists in an amount equivalent to 
two-month's rent.5 (See Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 5-6, 
17; Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 9-10.) LSI's attorney 
objected to Kudlik's attempt to surreptitiously "cure" the defaults 
by delivering a check for a portion of the rent and other monies 
owed under the Lease and the Memorandum to Escrow Specialists after 
the commencement of litigation.6 (Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing 
at 17.) Despite this objection and the commencement of this 
litigation, LSI's attorney indicated that LSI still would be 
willing to allow Kudlik to cure the defaults and retain possession 
of the Premises, if done so within the time period specified by the 
unlawful detainer statute.7 (Id. at 10-11.) LSI's attorney stated 
5
 Kudlik erroneously gives this date as September 7, 1993. 
See Brief of Appellant at 12. 
6
 Following the hearing, LSI's attorney contacted Escrow 
Specialists and requested Escrow Specialists to determine if 
Kudlik's check would clear. (Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 
9-10.) Escrow Specialists called the bank upon which the check was 
drawn and was informed that the account contained insufficient 
funds to cover the check. (Id.) Upon receiving this information, 
LSI's attorney returned the check to Kudlik's attorney. (Id. at 
10.) 
7
 LSI's attorney stated: 
I think I am sympathetic to Mr. Anderson's position and I 
think that my client, although they feel that they have 
been strung along, would be—still be willing to allow Mr. 
Kudlik to elect Option 2(a), which is to pay us within the 
three-day period, and that period expires at the close of 
business tomorrow. If Mr. Kudlik pays what the statute 
requires him to pay and what he's obligated to pay under 
the lease, I think Living Scriptures would be happy to 
9 
that the unlawful detainer statute gave Kudlik until the end of the 
following business day. (Id. at 10.) Kudlik's attorney, however, 
requested Kudlik be given until September 13, 1993 to pay. (Id. at 
35.) Although, by statute, LSI could have insisted on a cure of 
all defaults by September 8, 1993, LSI's attorney agreed to give 
Kudlik until noon on September 13, 1993 to cure the defaults. (Id. 
at 36.) 
Pursuant to the hearing, on September 13, 1993, Judge West 
entered an Order Regarding Restitution ("Restitution Order"). (R. 
at 66-69, 94.) The Restitution Order provided that, in order for 
Kudlik to retain possession of the Premises pending a further 
hearing, Kudlik must pay the rent, late fees, and interest owing to 
LSI and make a partial payment of the attorney's fees incurred by 
LSI to date, by cashier's check to LSI's attorney by noon on 
September 13, 1993. (Id. at 68.) In addition, the Restitution 
Order required Kudlik to post a $5,000.00 bond to cover any issues 
remaining in dispute, pending a further hearing. (Id.) In the 
event Kudlik failed to make the required payments and to post the 
specified bond, the Restitution Order provided that LSI would be 
entitled to an order of restitution of the Premises. (Id.) 
Finally, the Restitution Order provided that a hearing would be 
held at a later date to determine the following issues: the amount 
work with Mr. Kudlik to try to keep him on track . . . . 
(Id. at 10-11.) 
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of attorneys fees owing by Kudlik to LSI; the legal significance, 
if any, of Kudlik's purported tender to Escrow Specialists; the 
extent, if any, to which LSI's claims against Kudlik were barred by 
the doctrines of estoppel and waiver; and any claim for damages 
that either party may have against the other. (Id. at 69.) 
Needless to say, Kudlik failed to comply with the conditions of 
the Restitution Order. (Id. at 94.) On September 20, 1993, Judge 
West held a hearing to determine the two issues submitted by the 
parties, i.e., the reasonableness of LSI's attorney's fees and 
whether LSI had waived or would be estopped from requiring timely 
performance from Kudlik based on Kudlik7s having made four late 
rent payments late. (Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 2-3.) 
At that hearing, Judge West made a specific finding of fact that 
LSI gave Kudlik reasonable notice before insisting on strict 
performance of payment terms of the Lease and the Memorandum. (R. 
at 94.) In addition, Judge West determined that LSI had not waived 
its right to timely performance under the Lease and the Memorandum, 
that there was no basis for estoppel against LSI, (Tr. of September 
20, 1993 Hearing at 32-33; R. at 95), and that Kudlik had been in 
unlawful detainer of the Premises since August 27, 1993.8 (Tr. of 
September 20, 1993 Hearing at 33; R. at 95.) Accordingly, Judge 
West entered an Order of Restitution directing Kudlik to restore 
B
 Judge West also found the attorneys fees claimed by LSI to 
be reasonable. (Id. at 36-37.) That finding is not at issue on 
this appeal. 
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possession of the Premises to LSI, (R. at 81-82) , and ordered 
Kudlik to pay the past-due rent, treble rent from August 27, 1993 
to the date of the hearing, LSI's attorney's fees and costs, and 
post-judgment interest. (R. at 98.) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Kudlik's sole argument on appeal is that, as a consequence of 
LSI's acceptance of four late rental payments, LSI has waived, or 
should be estopped from asserting, its right to receive timely 
performance under the Lease and the Memorandum. Kudlik's argument 
is without merit for at least three reasons. First, the concept of 
waiver or estoppel by the acceptance of late payments is 
inapplicable where, as in this case, the parties have agreed in 
advance that such conduct would not constitute a waiver. In the 
case at hand, the parties agreed in the Memorandum that a waiver by 
either party of any breach was not to be construed as a consent by 
that party to any future breach by the other party. 
Second, Kudlik has failed to meet his burden of proof of 
demonstrating the existence of either waiver or estoppel. With 
regard to waiver, Kudlik has failed to show that LSI's acceptance 
of a few late rental payments is sufficient, in light of the 
circumstances of the case, to support a reasonable finding that LSI 
voluntarily and intentionally relinquished its right to terminate 
the Lease upon Kudlik's continued failure to make timely payments 
thereunder. With regard to estoppel, Kudlik has failed to prove 
the existence of any of its elements. Specifically, Kudlik has 
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failed to prove (1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
by LSI inconsistent with LSI's claim that LSI is entitled to 
terminate the Lease as a result of Kudlik's failure to make 
payments under the terms of the Lease and the Memorandum; (2) 
reasonable reliance on the part of Kudlik; and (3) an injury 
resulting from LSI's conduct. 
Third, even if this Court were to find that LSI temporarily 
waived its right to receive timely payments under the Lease and the 
Memorandum, or should be estopped from asserting that right absent 
reasonable notice to Kudlik of its intent to require strict 
compliance with the payment terms of the Lease and the Memorandum, 
LSI gave Kudlik such notice. Following that notice, Kudlik neither 
paid the past-due amounts nor complied thereafter with the payment 
terms. Accordingly, Judge West's ruling must be affirmed. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Kudlik/s Assertion of Waiver or Estoppel is Barred by the 
No-Waiver Provision in the Memorandum. 
Although Kudlik correctly quotes the Restatement of Property 
for the proposition that n>[t]he landlord may waive his right to 
the prompt payment of rent by acting in such a manner that the 
tenant is led to believe that a later date of payment than 
specified in the lease is acceptable,'" Brief of Appellant at 8 
(quoting Restatement (2d) of Property, Landlord and Tenant, § 12.1, 
comment c. (1977) [hereinafter the Restatement]), Kudlik 
conveniently fails to tell this Court that the quoted statement is 
13 
predicated on the absence of a no-waiver provision in the agreement 
between the parties. Indeed, the sentence immediately following 
the one quoted by Kudlik provides: "A no-waiver provision in the 
lease preserves the landlord's right to the payment of the rent on 
the due date." Restatement § 12.1, comment c (emphasis added). 
The Restatement applies that principle in illustrations 2 and 4 to 
section 12.1. 
Illustration 2 provides the general rule in the absence of a 
no-waiver provision in the Lease: 
L leases to T for five years, rent to be paid in advance 
at the beginning of each month. The rent includes the 
payment of the previous month's utility charges, but the 
utility bill is regularly sent too late to be paid on the 
first of the month. After a few months, T, without an 
express agreement, begins paying his rent late enough in 
the month to include the utility bill. L accepts each late 
check without objection. L has waived the right to require 
prompt payment of the rent, and T is not in default if he 
continues his past practices. If, however, L gives T 
notice that the rent is to be thereafter paid on the first 
of the month and T fails to comply, he will be in default 
on his rent obligation. . . . 
Id. , comment c , Illustration 2. 
Illustration 4 explains the effect of a no-waiver provision in 
the lease between the parties:9 
9
 Illustration 4 cross-references illustration 2, quoted 
above, and Illustration 3, which provides as follows: 
L orally leases an apartment to T from week to week, rent 
to be paid in advance. For several months L calls at the 
apartment each Sunday and picks up the rent check. For three 
weeks L fails to pick up the checks, which are ready for him. 
The relevant statute provides that if rent is in arrears for 
fifteen days, whether demanded or not, the landlord may reenter 
or recover possession of the premises. T finds L and tenders 
14 
Assume that the lease in Illustration 2 or in Illustration 
3 contains the following provision: 
"The waiver of one breach of any term, 
condition, covenant, obligation, or agreement of 
this lease shall not be considered to be a 
waiver of that or any other term, condition, 
covenant, obligation, or agreement or of any 
subsequent breach thereof." 
In such case T is in default in both Illustrations 2 
and 3. 
Id., comment c , Illustration 4 (emphasis added). 
A number of courts have accepted the principle articulated in 
the Restatement regarding the effect of a no-waiver provision. The 
California Court of Appeals first relied on this principle in Brown 
v. Chowchilla Land Co. . 210 P. 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922), a decision 
quoted approvingly by the Utah Supreme Court in Pacific Dev. Co. v. 
Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948).10 
In Brown, the parties entered into a series of three separate 
contracts for the purchase of real estate (the "Contracts") over a 
term of seven and one-half years. Brown, 210 P. at 424. The 
Contracts provided for monthly payments of principal and interest 
the checks to him. L refuses to take the checks, and declares 
the lease is terminated. T is not in default, because the 
conduct of the parties established a time and manner of payment 
which were followed by T. 
Id. Illustration 3. 
The lease in Stewart did not contain a no-waiver provision. 
Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court did not have occasion 
specifically to consider the effect of such a provision. The 
Court's opinion is consistent, however, with the conclusion that 
such a provision would have been given effect. 
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on the first day of each month and (as with the Lease in this 
appeal) stated that time was of the essence. Id. The Contracts 
also specified that the purchaser's rights in and to the property 
would terminate upon breach and gave the seller the option to 
declare a forfeiture of all monies paid by the purchaser upon a 
default in the payment of any sums due under the Contracts. Id. 
Finally, the Contracts each contained the following no-waiver 
provision: 
The waiver by the seller of any breach of any covenant 
or agreement herein contained on the part of the purchaser 
shall not be deemed or held to be a waiver of any 
subsequent or other breach of said covenant or agreement, 
nor a waiver of any other covenant or agreement herein 
contained. 
Id. at 425. 
The purchaser made the first seven payments on time but then 
made payments under the Contracts sporadically and in varying 
amounts. Id. The seller accepted the purchaser's payments for 
nearly five and one-half years without objection but then sent the 
purchaser a notice cancelling the contracts because of the 
purchaser's failure to make payments on time. Id. The purchaser 
brought an action for specific performance of the Contracts, 
arguing that the seller had waived its rights to terminate the 
Contracts without notice and an opportunity to cure by its extended 
practice of accepting late payments. Id. The trial court 
disagreed, holding for the seller, and the purchaser appealed. 
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Although acknowledging the general rule that a vendor may waive 
strict compliance with the payment terms of a contract by accepting 
overdue payments without objection, the California Court of Appeals 
held the principle inapplicable where the parties had agreed 
beforehand that such conduct would not constitute a waiver. Id. at 
427. The court stated: 
The requirement of notice after the receipt of overdue 
payments without objection is based upon the equitable 
consideration that by his conduct the vendor has led the 
vendee into the belief that the former will continue to 
waive the strict performance of the contract. The 
principle of equitable estoppel is involved. But the 
reason for the rule does not exist where the parties have 
expressly agreed that such waiver shall not affect any 
subsequent breach or relinquish the right of the vendor to 
insist thereafter upon strict observance with the terms of 
the contract. 
Id. The court found that the no-waiver provision in the Contracts 
constituted an adequate expression of the parties' intent that the 
acceptance of overdue payments was to be regarded as an indulgence 
to the purchaser, and not as a waiver of the seller's right to 
timely performance of the Contracts.11 Id. Accordingly, the court 
held that the seller retained the right to declare a forfeiture 
11
 Specifically, the court stated: 
The parties could not fail to understand from the 
particular covenant in question that the acceptance of any 
overdue payment or payments was to be regarded as an 
indulgence to the vendee, but as to the future the whole 
contract remained in full force and effect and rendered 
the vendee subject to the penalty of forfeiture for any 
default thereafter. 
Id. The court upheld the parties' legal right to agree to such a 
provision. Id. 
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upon the purchaser's failure to make timely payments, without 
providing the purchaser with advance notice of its intent to 
strictly enforce the payment terms of the Contracts. Id. 
The California Court of Appeals reached the same result in the 
context of a commercial lease in Karbelnig v. Brothwell, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966). In Karbelnicr. the parties entered 
into a written lease for the rental of certain real property for a 
term of fifteen years. Id. at 3 36. The lease contained both a 
provision prohibiting assignment by the tenant without the consent 
of the landlord and a no-waiver provision.12 Id. Despite the 
existence of the provision prohibiting assignment, the tenant 
assigned its interest in the lease without the consent of the 
landlord. Id. at 336-38. Upon being notified of the assignment, 
the landlord accepted rental payments from the assignees, but 
notified the tenant that such acceptance should not be construed as 
an acceptance or waiver to the assignment. Id. at 338. The trial 
The no-waiver clause provided: 
The waiver by Lessor of any breach of any term, covenant, 
or condition herein contained shall not be deemed to be a 
waiver of such term, covenant, or condition or any 
subsequent breach of the same or any other term, covenant, 
or condition herein contained. The subsequent acceptance 
of rent hereunder by Lessor shall not be deemed to be a 
waiver of any preceding breach by Lessee of any term, 
covenant, or condition of this lease, other than the 
failure of Lessee to pay the particular rental so 
accepted, regardless of Lessor's knowledge of such 
preceding breach at the time of acceptance of such rent. 
Id. 
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court held such conduct constituted a waiver of the breach. Id. at 
339. 
The California Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 340. The 
court began with the proposition that fl[w]aiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts." Id. 
The court then noted that the intent to waive a breach normally may 
be inferred by the acceptance of rental payments after learning of 
the breach. Id. Looking to decisions from other jurisdictions, 
however, the court held that such an inference is rebutted where 
the parties agreed in the lease that the acceptance of rent is 
without prejudice to the rights of the Landlord.13 Id. The court 
explained: 
The express agreement on the part of the lessees, which 
was binding upon their assignees, to the effect that the 
acceptance of rent by the lessor after knowledge of the 
breach of a covenant should not be deemed a waiver of such 
breach, is tantamount to a relinquishment of the right of 
the lessees and their assignees, to assert a waiver of 
[sic] estoppel, unless there has been an express waiver on 
the part of the lessor of the right reserved, or there has 
been conduct on the part of the lessor, other than the 
acceptance of rent, upon which the lessees or their 
assignees could lawfully assert an estoppel to declare a 
forfeiture. 
Id. at 341 (emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, the parties agreed that a waiver by either 
party of a breach by the other shall not be construed as a waiver 
13
 The court distinguished other California decisions that 
found waiver as the result of the acceptance of rent, noting that 
none of those decisions involved the existence of a no-waiver 
provision in the leases at issue. Id. at 340. 
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of any other or subsequent breach. Paragraph 4.d. of the 
Memorandum specifically provides: 
Any waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any kind or 
character whatsoever by any other party, whether such 
waiver be direct or implied, shall not be construed as a 
continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent breach 
of this Agreement on the part of the other party. 
Any inference of intent by LSI to waive its right to timely 
performance of the Lease and the Memorandum is precluded by the 
existence of the no-waiver provision in the parties' agreement.14 
By agreeing to such a provision, Kudlik voluntarily and 
intentionally relinquished his right to assert a waiver or estoppel 
against LSI based on the LSI's acceptance of past-due payments. 
LSI relied on the above no-waiver provision in an attempt to work 
with Kudlik instead of immediately terminating the Lease and acting 
to evict him, which right was specifically granted to LSI in 
Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum. In these circumstances, Kudlik is 
precluded as a matter of law from arguing waiver and estoppel 
against LSI. Judge West's ruling must therefore be affirmed. 
B. Kudlik Has Failed to Meet His Burden of Demonstrating Either 
Waiver or Estoppel, 
Even assuming, arguendo, that this Court were to find that 
Kudlik is not precluded from arguing waiver or estoppel by his 
14
 Moreover, as discussed below, intent to waive its right to 
timely payment may not be inferred against LSI as a result of its 
acceptance of a few late rental payments, particularly where LSI 
urged Kudlik to make his payments on time and promptly acted to 
enforce its rights when it became clear that Kudlik was unwilling 
or unable to do so. 
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express agreement to the no-waiver provision, Judge West's ruling 
must be affirmed because Kudlik failed to meet his burden of proof 
of demonstrating either waiver or estoppel. The record 
overwhelmingly supports Judge West's ruling that neither doctrine 
precludes LSI from asserting its rights under the Lease and the 
Memorandum. 
1. The Record Clearly Demonstrates that LSI Did Not Waive its 
Right to Insist on Timely Payments Under the Lease and the 
Memorandum. 
Waiver is "xthe intentional relinquishment of a known right.7" 
Soters v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 
(Utah 1993) (quoting Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 
P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1991)). As such, "[w]aiver requires three 
elements: (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) 
knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the 
right." Id. at 940. Because waiver is an affirmative defense, the 
burden of demonstrating each of its elements, including intent, 
lies with the party asserting it—Kudlik. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(c); Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 
(Utah 1976) . Kudlik must show from the evidence that the 
relinquishment was "clearly intended." Soters. 857 P. 2d at 941. In 
the case at hand, Kudlik failed to sustain his burden of showing 
the existence of waiver. Judge West's ruling must, therefore, be 
affirmed. 
Kudlik7s sole evidence in support of his waiver argument is 
LSI's acceptance of four late rental payments. Conspicuously 
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absent from Kudlik7s argument, however (and which Kudlik would like 
this Court to ignore), are the agreement between the parties, the 
context in which the four payments were accepted, the 
communications between the parties, and all of LSI's actions to 
enforce the Lease and the Memorandum. 
In January of 1993, when Kudlik first began to slip into a 
practice of making late payments, LSI acted immediately to get 
Kudlik back on track and to emphasis that LSI insisted on timely 
payments under the Lease. To that end, LSI and Kudlik entered into 
negotiations to cure the past defaults. The parties7 agreement was 
memorialized in the Memorandum. The Memorandum required payment of 
all past-due amounts according to a strict payment schedule and set 
forth in no uncertain terms that LSI insisted on strict compliance 
with the payment terms of the Lease. Accordingly, Paragraph 1 of 
the Memorandum provides, in relevant part: 
Any payment hereunder or under the Lease which is not 
received by LSI on or before its due date shall not be 
timely made and shall constitute a breach, 
(R. 182 f 1 (emphasis added).) Similarly, Paragraph 2 of the 
Memorandum provides, in relevant part: 
Kudlik shall make all other payments which are or become 
owed under the Lease in full and on time. 
(Id. at J 2 (emphasis added).) 
From the time the parties entered into the Memorandum until the 
commencement of this action, LSI's actions were consistent with its 
intent to require strict compliance with the payment terms of the 
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Lease and the Memorandum. During the first few months following 
the execution of the Memorandum, LSI continually "bird-dogged" 
Kudlik to try to get him to honor his agreement. (Tr. of September 
8, 1993 Hearing at 7.) It soon became clear to LSI, however, that 
they would have to resort to legal action to persuade Kudlik to 
meet his payment obligations. At that point, LSI contacted its 
attorney, who promptly called Kudlik, on two separate occasions, to 
demand that he immediately bring his payments current and 
thereafter comply strictly with the payment terms of the Lease and 
the Memorandum. (R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8; 
Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 25.) On August 20, 1993, 
after no response from Kudlik, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice to 
Quit. (R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8; Tr. of 
September 20, 1993 Hearing at 26.) Three days later, LSI served 
Kudlik with a second Notice to Quit.15 (R. 93; Tr. of September 
8, 1993 Hearing at 8.) Kudlik did not respond to either Notice to 
Quit, leaving LSI with no alternative but to commence this action. 
(R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8.) 
As the above actions show, LSI did not silently accept Kudlik7s 
late payments. Instead, LSI insisted Kudlik make timely payments, 
15
 After serving the Notices to Quit, LSI learned that Kudlik 
made a partial payment to Escrow Specialists on August 19, 1993 of 
only one month's rent, omitting the July and August rent then past 
due, as well as the late fees, interest, and attorney's fees, which 
he was obligated to pay under the Lease and the Memorandum. (R. 
197.) LSI accepted this partial payment in mitigation of its 
damages. 
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and each time Kudlik refused, LSI escalated its remedies, 
culminating in this lawsuit. The entire process, from Kudlik7s 
first late payment following his execution of the Memorandum to 
LSI's filing of this action, took only a little over six months. 
LSI gave Kudlik no false assurances that he could continue to flout 
his obligations. Instead, every communication between the parties 
during this time reiterated LSI's insistence that Kudlik make his 
payments on time.16 
16
 Each of the cases cited by Kudlik that found a waiver are 
factually inapplicable to this case. For example, in Pacific Dev. 
Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948), the seller 
accepted late payments from the purchasers over a period of 
approximately two years, without any objection, all the while 
assuring the purchasers that "no forfeiture of their rights was at 
that time contemplated, but that they should xdo the best you can7 
or they should catch it up as fast as they could." Id. at 749. 
Similarly, in Morris v. Sykes, 624 P. 2d 681 (Utah 1981), the 
parties were negotiating a reinstatement of the contract up to the 
time of unilateral termination by sellers, id. at 682-84, and in 
Tanner v. Baadscraard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980), the seller and 
purchaser had continually communicated regarding the purchasers 
anticipated purchase of the property up to the point when the 
seller informed the purchaser, for the first time, that he had 
arranged the sale of the property to another. Id. at 346-47. 
Grow v. Marwick Dev. , Inc. . 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980), did not 
involve the acceptance of late payments, but holds merely that 
where a seller under a real estate contract sent the purchaser two 
notices of default and a notice of forfeiture, to which the 
purchaser did not respond, and thereafter sent a subsequent notice 
of default giving the purchasers 15 days to cure, the seller's 
latter notice controlled. Id. at 1251-52. Similarly, Hansen v. 
Christensen, 545 P. 2d 1152 (Utah 1976), did not involve the 
acceptance of late payments, but rather holds that where a real 
estate sales contract offered the seller several alternative 
options upon default, none of which were self-executing, the 
purchaser is entitled to believe the contract continues in force 
until the seller elects a remedy and notifies the purchaser of the 
election. Id. at 1154. Finally, the cases of Girard v. Appleby. 
660 P.2d 245, 248-49 (Utah 1983), Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co.. 575 
P.2d 192, 194-95 (Utah 1978), and Woodland Theatres. Inc. v. ABC 
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The record is clear in the case at hand that LSI acted in 
accordance with the parties7 agreement that past waivers would not 
be construed as a continuing waiver or consent to a future breach 
and attempted to work with Kudlik instead of immediately 
terminating the Lease. When, after a reasonable period of time, 
those efforts proved ineffective, LSI acted promptly to enforce its 
rights. The record overwhelmingly supports Judge West's ruling 
that LSI did not intentionally waive its right to insist on strict 
compliance with the payment terms of the Lease and the Memorandum. 
LSI respectfully requests that this Court affirm Judge West's 
ruling. 
2. Kudlik Has Failed to Meet His Burden of Demonstrating 
Estoppel. 
Like waiver, estoppel is an affirmative defense. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 8(c). As such, Kudlik bears the entire burden of 
demonstrating the existence of each of its elements. Corporation 
Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 420 (1973). Kudlik 
has failed to meet his burden as to this affirmative defense. 
Whereas waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right, estoppel is a doctrine that precludes parties from asserting 
Intermountain Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700, 701-02 (Utah 1977), all 
hold merely that a party may not both declare a forfeiture of a 
lease and, at the same time, continue to accept rental payments 
during the period following the declaration of forfeiture. This is 
so despite the landlord's attempt to alter the rule by a unilateral 
declaration that the acceptance of rent does not constitute a 
waiver. See Girard, 660 P.2d at 248-49; Woodland Theatres, Inc., 
560 P.2d at 701. 
25 
their rights where their actions or conduct would render it 
inequitable for them to do so. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430, 432 
(Utah 1983). Estoppel requires proof of the following three 
elements: 
(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable 
action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the 
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would 
result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
CECO v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 
1989) . Kudlik has failed to prove any of these elements. 
First, Kudlik has failed to show a statement, admission, act, 
or failure to act on the part of LSI that is inconsistent with 
LSI's insistence on compliance with the payment terms of the Lease 
and the Memorandum. Kudlik has made no allegation and offered no 
evidence that LSI expressly stated that it would not insist on 
compliance with those terms or that LSI made any admission contrary 
to such insistence. Rather, Kudlik argues that LSI's mere 
acceptance of four late rental payments is inconsistent with its 
present assertion of the right to terminate the Lease based on 
Kudlik7s continued failure to timely make subsequent payments. 
LSI's actions are completely consistent with such an assertion. 
As discussed above, during the time period in question, LSI 
attempted time and again to get Kudlik to make timely rental 
payments. As each attempt failed, LSI escalated its actions, 
finally bringing this lawsuit. LSI in no way misled Kudlik into 
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believing that LSI would not act to terminate the Lease in the 
event Kudlik continued to ignore his payment obligations. To the 
contrary, LSI insisted, at every juncture, that Kudlik comply with 
those provisions. 
Second, Kudlik has failed to offer any evidence whatsoever that 
he actually relied on any actions of LSI. Kudlik failed to even 
proffer evidence that he could have made the rental payments on 
time, but chose not to based on LSI's acceptance of four late 
payments. Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that 
Kudlik did in fact rely on LSI's acceptance of those four late 
payments, Kudlik has failed to demonstrate that such claimed 
reliance was reasonable in light of the no-waiver provision in the 
Memorandum and LSI's continual "bird-dogging" efforts. As noted 
above, Kudlik expressly agreed in the Memorandum that a waiver by 
LSI of any past breach would not constitute a waiver of any future 
breach. Kudlik makes no allegation that the parties waived that 
provision, either expressly or by any conduct other than that which 
the parties expressly agreed would not constitute a waiver. 
Kudlik's claimed reliance on LSI's temporary forbearance, 
therefore, was not reasonable, even if actual. 
Finally, Kudlik has failed to demonstrate that his claimed 
injury resulted from his purported reliance on LSI's waiver of past 
overdue payments. Specifically, as noted above, Kudlik failed to 
proffer any evidence to the trial court that he could have made the 
rent payments on time in the absence of any such reliance. In 
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light of such failure, and of Kudlik's failure to establish the 
existence of the other elements of estoppel, Kudlik7s claim of 
estoppel must fail. Judge West's ruling must therefore be 
affirmed. 
C. Even if LSI Temporarily Waived its Right to Timely Payment 
Under the Lease and the Memorandum, Which LSI Did Not, LSI Gave 
Kudlik Reasonable Notice of its Intent to Require Compliance 
with Those Terms in the Future. 
Kudlik argues, without any foundation in fact, that "[w]here a 
landlord routinely, and without objection, accepts past due 
payments and leads the tenant to believe that strict adherence to 
the payment schedule will not be required, the law requires the 
landlord to provide the tenant with reasonable notice that it will 
insist on strict performance." Brief of Appellant at 7. Even 
assuming the validity of that statement and its applicability to 
the case at hand, however, Kudlik has no reason to complain in the 
present case because LSI did not routinely accept late payments 
without objection and LSI gave Kudlik reasonable notice of its 
intent to require strict compliance with the Lease and the 
Memorandum.17 
17
 As discussed above, LSI's acceptance of four late payments 
was far from a "routine" practice, and the acceptance was not 
"without objection." During the period of these four payments, LSI 
was continually "bird-dogging" Kudlik to bring his payments current 
and to thereafter make them in a timely manner. Furthermore, in 
light of the no-waiver provision agreed to by the parties, LSI's 
conduct could not reasonably be construed as "leading the tenant to 
believe" that strict compliance with the payment terms would not be 
required. 
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LSI accepted the last rental payment on August 19, 1993, 
leaving at least two months of rental payments past due.18 The 
following day, and again on August 23, 1993, LSI caused a three-day 
Notice to Quit to be served on Kudlik. Kudlik did not comply with 
either Notice, thereby forcing LSI to file this action on August 
27, 1993. 
On September 2 and 4, 1993, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice of 
Filing of Possession Bond and of Remedies Available to Defendant, 
which included the option of full payment within 3 days after 
service. Kudlik did not choose that option, but instead requested 
a hearing. At the September 8, 1993 hearing, however, LSI's 
attorney indicated LSI's continued willingness to allow Kudlik to 
cure his defaults, if done so within the time-frame set forth in 
the unlawful detainer statute. (Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing 
at 10-11.) LSI's attorney suggested payment by the end of the 
following day. (Id.) Kudlik's attorney, however, requested Kudlik 
18
 Despite Kudlik's contention that LSI "accepted" a rental 
payment on September 3, 1993, the evidence demonstrates otherwise. 
First, LSI returned Kudlik's check to Kudlik's attorney. (Tr. of 
September 20, 1993 Hearing at 9-10.) LSI was entitled to refuse 
tender of payment following Kudlik's breach of the Lease and the 
Memorandum. See Shoemaker v. Pioneer Invests. , 14 Utah 2d 250, 381 
P.2d 735, 736 (1963). Second, the check was drawn on an account 
that contained insufficient funds to pay it. (Tr. of September 20, 
1993 Hearing at 9-10.) A bad check does not constitute "payment," 
and mere receipt of a bad check does not constitute "acceptance" of 
payment. Moreover, it is ridiculous for Kudlik to claim, for the 
purpose of arguing waiver or estoppel, that he relied on such an 
"acceptance" when the purported payment was made after the filing 
of the Complaint in this action and LSI's efforts to recover 
possession of the Premises. 
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be given until the following Monday, September 13, 1993. (Id. at 
35.) LSI's attorney agreed to this request, giving Kudlik until 
noon on September 13, 1993 to cure the defaults. (Id. at 36.) 
Thus, Kudlik had 21 days from the August 23, 1993 Notice to Quit 
(24 days from the August 20, 1993 Notice to Quit) in which to cure 
the defaults. Kudlik did not do so. Therefore, Kudlik7s argument 
that he was not given a reasonable time to cure the defaults must 
be rejected. Judge West's ruling should be affirmed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The essence of Kudlik's argument is that LSI should not have 
worked with him, but rather LSI should have immediately invoked its 
rights under the unlawful detainer statute on the first day after 
Kudlik was late on his next payment. Kudlik asked Judge West, and 
is now asking this Court, to punish LSI for having worked with 
Kudlik in "bird-dogging" him to bring his payments current. Kudlik 
shamelessly makes this argument despite the fact that he and LSI 
specifically agreed in the Memorandum that LSI's acceptance of late 
payments would not constitute a waiver and despite the fact that 
LSI went to extreme measures to prompt Kudlik to honor his 
obligations. To add insult to injury, Kudlik makes his argument 
without any showing whatsoever of any reliance on his part, either 
actual or reasonable, on any actions of LSI. 
As set forth above, LSI went to extreme measures to encourage 
Kudlik to honor his obligations under the Lease and the Memorandum. 
Kudlik should not be rewarded by this Court for his ability to 
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manipulate LSI's kindness. Kudlik had failed to carry his burden 
of proof as the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel. 
LSI therefore respectfully urges this Court to affirm Judge 
West's ruling. LSI also requests that this Court award LSI the 
costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, incurred in responding 
to Kudlik's appeal. See Judge West's award of attorneys fees, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 91-96); Final Judgment 
(R. 97-99); Augmented Judgment Regarding Attorneys' Fees (R. 110-
111); Lease § X (R. 142-53); Memorandum f 4.g. (R. 154-56); Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992). 
DATED this £*/ day of May, 1994. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Scott F. Young, Esq. 
Mark A. Wagner, Esq. 
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Attorneys for LiVing Scriptures, Inc. 
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Tab A 
LEASE 
iL£ T. Bftowtrme 
>THT w. BiACJtaumr { 
mJLx Ft. BALDWIN 
ON R. KUHZLEX 
T Q U K C r S XX VAV/ 
( W A S N I K & T O N P J . V ? . I 
THIS LEAGE, made this t-ywr*"day of June, 1S85, by *IK1 
between Myrtle M. Crouchr a single women, heit-inaf te£ L^£^±LL\±6 
to cti LeabuL axid Jay Aiidtiii^ uii and Dale Minsonr severally 
and jointly, hereinafter referred to as Lessee. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the Lesser owns certain property located in 
Ogden City, Weber County, State of Utah, which property is 
presently leased to American Oil Company, and, 
WHEREAS, American Oil Company is not utilising the 
premises, and, 
WHEREASr it is contemplated by Lessor that the American 
Oil Company will agree to terminate their Lease with the 
Lessor or allow the Lessee to take possession of the premises 
subject to the conditions and provisions of this Lease, and, 
WHEREAS, the Lessee desires to lease said property 
for the construction of a car wash facility; 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
and agreements herein contained, the parties agree as follows: 
I. PREMISES In consideration of the f^i^hfnl perfor-
mance of the covenants and considerations hereinafter agreed 
to by Lessor and Lessee, the Lessor does hereby lease and 
demise to the Lessee the following described premises situated 
in the City of ogden, County of Wefcer, state of Utah, mere 
particularly described as follows, to-*?it:. 
Lots 25, 2S, 27 and 28 in Block 42 NELSON PARK ADDITION 
to Oqden City, Weber County, Utah. 
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I II. TSJRM. Subject to earlier termination by th« oper-
ation of any forfeiture clause or other right rp.sftnzp^  herein, 
the tern of this Lease shall be for a perfnn of twenty (20) 
I years• Said Lease tarn to commence at t-he termination of 
[} the present Lease ber.vraftn thp Lessor and American Oil Comoany 
it * 
|i 
! or at such time as Aiasricsn Oil Company enters into an aare»-
ment with Looser and L*39<*e. allowing XCL Liie cammenceinent 
of Lhis Lease, 
j III. PAlMJKNT AND CHAKSJBS. The monthly Lease payment 
for the first tive (b) years ot this Lease shall be an amount 
of Twelve Hundred Dollars, ($1,200-00) per month. The monthly 
I lease payment for the remaining fifteen (15) years shall 
be adjusted each two (2) years commencing on the sixth (6th; 
I year and continuing each two (2) years thereafter^ through 
the balance of the Lease term. The amount of the adjusted 
monthly lease payment shall be made based on the increase 
of the Consumer Price Index for the previous period. It 
being the intention of the parties that the montnly lease 
payment for the sixth (6th)year shall be increased by the 
percentage increase of the Consumer Price Index for the first 
five (5) year period. The adjustment for the monthly lease 
payment for year eight (8) and nine (9) shall be based on 
the percentage increase of the Consumer Price Index for the 
previous two (25 year period, and so nn through the remaining 
years of the Lease. Notwithstanding the above, it is acjrssd 
between the parties that the amount o£ increase for any t-?c 
(2) year period shall not exceed 35* loi Lhe SX-KLK and 
seventh year or 14% for any subsequent two year period. 
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|f It is turther agreed between the parties that at no time 
during the term of this Lease shall the monthly lease payment 
decrease, whether or not the Consumer Price Index is negative* 
Monthly lease payments shall be paid in advance and 
shall commence upon the effective date of this Lease. 
Any payment which is not paid to the Lessor within 
ten (10; days after the due date shall bear interest at the 
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum for the due date until 
said sum is paid in full. 
The Lessee agrees to pay all real property taxes when 
due and ail other assessments on the property during the 
entire term of this Lease. 
IV. PROCEDURE FOR PAYMENT. The monthly lease payment 
shall be paid and delivered to the Lessor tc Lessor's savings 
account in the MountainWest Savings and Loan Association/ 
2406 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah, savings account 
SG1-Q2S82S-14 or at such other placs as the Lessor may froT. 
time tc time designate in writing. 
V- INSURANCE. Concurrent with the effective day o£ 
this Ledse, the Lessee sh^ll ubLdiu IJLUIU e± £*» liable insurance 
company authorized to do business in the state of Utah, and 
shall maintain in full force and effect during the term cf 
this Lease a policy or policies of insurance for public lia-
bility en the premises in a sum not less that One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars, ($100,000-00). 
VI. OSE OF PKEMISE5. The leased premises shall be 
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used for the construction and operation of a car waqh. The 
Lessee agrees to indemnify and save harmless Lessor and 
Lessorls prnppri-y "From all r.l;H.rn*r mechanic lions, damag-QC, 
demands. actions, costs and charges arising out of or by 
reason of the erection and construction of tha improvements 
herein contemplated and the operation or the business herein 
authorized on the y-Leiiiises Liei.t»in d^ iiii^ eu dutiny Lhe lem. 
ot tms Lease and any extensions thereafter, 
VII. LESSEEf S ASSIGNMENT OR SUBLEASE. It is agreed 
between the Lessor and the Lessee that the Lessee may not 
assign this Lease or sublet the premises without the consent 
of the Lessor, which consent shell not be unreasonably with-
held. 
VIII* HOLDOVER. In the event Lessee shall hold over 
beyond the expiration of the term herein provided, it is 
expressly understood and agreed that any such holdover tenancy 
shall be a month to month tenancy only, and either Lessor 
or Lessee may terminate such tenancy at any time by giving 
the other party thirty (30) days written notice of its inten-
tion to do so. 
IX. BANKRUPTCY. In the event of any default in the 
performance of any of the covenants on the Lessee's part 
to be Vppt or in th*. event of abandonment by the Lessee or 
the lawful holder of the Lease, shall be judicially &ecl*r*r-
insolvent, or if any petition is filed in or any proceeding 
commenced under the bankruptcy laws of the united Scatcc 
by said Lessee or the Lessee holder
 r or if a ye Li Lion for 
If 
,VC ~ - BROOMING 
ITHY W . B U C K D U W C j 
OH R. <CUK£L-ER 
T f ^ C Y S AT LAW 
%A.WNCTON OL.VD. (J 
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nfefuxyanization be filed by the .Lessee, or any execution be 
Issued against it, or any of its effects, and the same be 
net vacated, satisfied, bonded or discharged, as the result 
of which the demised premises may be taken or if a receiver 
or trustee be appointed of its property by a Court of competent 
jurisdiction ard said appointment is not contested, or if 
contested, said appointment has become final/ or if Lessee 
shell make an assignment for the benefit or creditors or 
if the interest of Lessee shall be sold at a judicial sale, 
then in any of such event, it shall be lawful for the Lesser, 
and the Lessor is hereby given the right to terminate this 
Lease on ten (1C) days written notice to that effect and 
at the end of such period the term hereby granted shall immedi-
ately cease, terminate and come to an end as fully as if 
the entire period herein provided had expired. 
X. COSTS FOR DEFAULT. In the event either the Lessor 
or the Lessee commences legal action against the other claiming 
a hrpar.h or npfsn^ nf this T.PSSP, +*he prpvsiling p^rty in 
such litigation shall bo entitled to recover from the other 
reasonable attorney's fees and ell costs connected with said 
liLiydLiux:-
xi. NOTICE, it is further understood and agreed that 
all notices given under this Lease shall be deemed to be 
properly served if delivered in writing personally, or sent 
by certified mail to Lessor or Lessee at his then current 
address. 
XII. SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST. The terms, conditions 
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and covenants of this Lease shall be binding upon and shall 
inure to the benefit of each of the parties hereto, their 
heirs, personal representatives, successor's sublessees or 
assign*, and sh«n run with the land; and whftr* more than 
one party shall be K « w »«*** this Lease, the word "Less**" 
whenever used in this Lease shall be deemed to include all 
parLiss of leasee jointly and severally. 
X X I 1_ RIGHT CF FIRST REFUSAL TO PURCaRSE. The Lessee 
is nereby given the righx of first refusal tc purchase the 
Leased property together with the adjacent and adjoining 
property presently cwned by tne Lessor. The right of first 
refusal includes the entire parcel of property owned by the 
Lessor and does not include any smaller parcel including 
only the real property subject to this Lease. After the 
Lessor receives an offer to purchase the entire property 
as set out above, written notice of said offer shall be given 
to the Lessee and Lessee shall have fifteen (15) days fro* 
the date of the written notice to exercise its first right 
of refusal to purchase the property. Notwithstanding any 
provision contained herein, the Lessor may transfer the 
property to any of her children as part of their inheritance 
without being subject to this provision. Any such transfer 
shall bind said child to the provisions of this Lease including 
thP right of first refusal. 
XV. TIME. Tim© 5.« r>? th<* fissence of this Lease. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereco have ™ns«d 
this document to be duly executed, in triplicate, with ail 
ALE T- SftSWNlK© 
OTKT W . SLACKOyaN 
MCtXT R. BAUCWIK 
TTUMHtrS AT UAW j 
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the formalities required by lav on the respective date set 
forth above. 
JUULK T* l « O W N ( M « 
IOTMT W. BUACMMUmH 
AJHJCT R- PALDWIff 
RON a . KUNZUft 
MYRTLE M. CROUCH,LESSOR 
JAY ANDERSON,LESSEE 
SENT BY: 1 0^-92 ; 7:41AM : 3940635:* 2/ 3 
ASSIGNMENT OP LEASE AND CONSENT OP LESSOH 
Agreement made September 18, 1989 between Jay Anderson 
and Dale Minson, City of Ogden, County of Weber, State of 
Utah, herein referred to as assignor, and Alan Shaw of City 
of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, herein 
referred to as assignee* 
RECITALS 
1. Assignor entered into a lease, as lessee therein, 
on Juno 26, 1985 with Myrtle Crouch, a single women, herein 
referred to as lessor• 
2. Assignor desires to assign, and assignee desires 
to assume all of the right, duties, and liabilities of lessee 
thereunder. 
In consideration of One Dollar ($1.00), receipt of 
which is acknowledged by assignor, assignor assigns the 
lease to assignee effective September 19, 1989 for the balance 
of the lease term of 20 years provided in the lease. The 
lease commenced on June 26, 1935* 
Assignee shall assume all rights and duties required 
of assignor under the lease including all payments required 
thereby and shall comply with all terms and conditions of 
the lease, and hold the Assignor harmless. 
CONSENT OF LESSOR 
Myrtle Crouch and/or her representative, lessor in 
the above-described lease, consents to assignment and transfer 
of the lease, including all terms and conditions thereof, 
to assignee. 
This Assignment does not release Jay Anderson or Dale 
Minson from the original Lease. 
JtJll OI 1 "0-32 ; 7:41AM ; 3940635;* 3/ 3 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this 
Agreement this day of September, I989. 
ASSIGNOR 
fl* Uivkw*^ 
Dale Minson 
ASSIGNEE 
Alan Shaw 
LESSOR 
Myrtle Crouch by her representative 
AMENDED LEASE 
The parties Myrtle M. Crouch, Lesser, and Alan Shaw, 
Assignee, hereby amend the June 26, 1985 lease as follows: 
If Lessor decides Lo sell the corner lot, Alan shaw 
shall have the first right to puTh*se said lot. The purchase 
price stall be the price Lesser places on the property. 
The balance of the lease dated June 26, L9S5, shall 
remain in full force and effect. 
Dated this day of April, 1990. 
hi »& 2to /£n.~,.*J • 
MXfiTI-E M. CROUCH, L e s s o r 
ALAN SHAW, Assignee 
ASSIGNMENT OF L2AS2 AMD 
CONSENT 0? LESSOR 
Agreement made February. 15, 1991, between Alan Shaw, 
City of Ogcen, cour-ty of Weber, state of Utah, herein referred to 
as assignor, and MichaelJohn Kudlik, City of Sell Lake, coun.y of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, herein referred to as assignee. 
RECITALS 
1. Assignor rece ived an Assignment of Lease on 
September 13, 19Sr, of a ip.ase da t sd June 26, 1985 in which Myrtle 
Crouch, a s i ng l e woman, i s the l e s s o r (a copy of which t h e assigr.es 
has r e c e i v e d ) . 
2. Assignor d e s i r e s t o ass ign , and a s s i g n e e d e s i r e s to 
assume a l l of t he r i g h t , d u t i e s , and l i a b i l i t i e s of l e s see 
t h e r e u n d e r . This Assignment, s h a l l not r e l i e v e t h e a s s i g n o r of a i l 
c f t h e r i g h t , d u t i e s , and l i a b i l i t i e s of l e s s e e should the ass ignee 
d e f a u l t in any of the terms o£ t h e l e a s e . 
In cons ide ra t ion cf One Dollar ',•?!. 00 ) , r e c e i p t cf which 
i s acknowledged by ass ignor , a s s ignor a s s i gns t h e l e a s e t o ass ignee 
e f f e c t i v e February 16, 1991, for the balance of t h e l e a s e term cf 
20 y*a r s provided in t h e l e a s e . Thp. l e a s e commenced on June 26, 
1985. 
Assignee s h a l l assume a i l r i g h t s and d u t i e s requi red of 
a s s i g n o r under the l e a s e inc lud ing a i l payments r e q u i r e d thereby 
*nd s h a l l comply with a l l Lerms and cond i t ions of t h e l e a s e , and 
hold t h e assignor harrcip-ss. 
CONSENT OF LESSOR 
Myrtle Crouch and/or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , l e s s o r ir. the 
above described I s c s e , consents t o assignment and t r a n s f e r of tr.e 
l e a s e , including a i l terms and couOiUons the reo f , to a s s i g n e e . 
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IN WITNESS WHEH20P, the parties have signed this 
Agreement this .^WTVI <*ay °f July , 1991. 
ASSIGNOR 
Alan Shaw M./ w£-
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to hfifnre mo this 
or 
July , lssi. 
My Commission.' C^ g-Iuc.:?? 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE CFITVW 
MyCgiRi&soiEtpns 
Feb.\»y5.1004 
ROEYNVV. JOHNSON 
3776S»uftHigi»f*Qt 
SattU*tCiar,UahKta6 
^ ^ G ^ ^ y v - ^ 
W0TAR5T 1>UBEIC 
Residing at/ Ogden, Utah 
6 2 0 ^ :> 
ASSIGNEE 
J0&4u / 
y^firchaej^ohn Kudlik 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn Lu 
J u l y , 1991-
before me t i u s 
N O T A R Y P U B L I C 
^ STKTSOFUTAH 
) 'roso^5,1DC5 
/ R0SY»W. JOHNSON 
3775SoufoHiahtencfQf, 
San Lab Oy. UUh s«06 
My Commission .-:xpi r*.s: 
NOTARY PURL 
1 Residina a\ 
LESSOR 
^rtlji Crouch by her Myrt r 
r eoresen ta t ive 
SUBSCRIBED and oworn t o befoLe ine t h i s dav o: 
July , 19S1, 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Ogden, Utah 
TabB 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
(Michaeljohn Kudlik) 
THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ("Agreement") is made and entered into in 
Ogden, Utah, as of the 25th day of January, 1993, by and between Living Scriptures, Inc., a Utah 
corporation with a place of business at 4646 South 1500 West, Ogden, Utah 84405 ("LSI"); and 
Michaeljohn Kudlik, an individual and doing business as California Suds with a place of business at 4700 
South 900 East, Suite 30-165, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 ("Kudlik"). 
Background 
On or about June 26, 1985, Myrtle M. Crouch, as lessor, and Jay Anderson and Dale Minson, 
as lessees, entered into a Lease agreement (the "Lease") with respect to certain real property located at 
3685 Harrison Boulevard in Ogden, Utah (the "Property") for purposes of lessees constructing and 
operating a car wash facility. LSI has recently purchased the Property and is the assignee of all of 
lessor's rights under the Lease. Kudlik is the assignee of lessees' rights and obligations under the Lease; 
prior lessees have not been relieved of their obligations under the Lease. In conjunction with LSFs 
purchase of the Property, Kudlik and others waived the first right of refusal to purchase the Property and 
adjoining property. Under the terms of the Lease, Kudlik is obligated to pay all real property taxes and 
assessments on the Property during the term of the Lease. LSI has paid the 1991 and 1992 real property 
taxes, and associated penalties and interest, in the total sum of $8,426.94, and has incurred attorneys' 
fees. LSI has demanded payment of such amounts from Kudlik. 
Agreement 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants herein set 
forth and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt, adequacy and legal sufficiency of which 
are hereby acknowledged, the parties mutually agree as follows: 
1. Payment bv Kudlik. Kudlik shall pay to LSI the full amount of Eight Thousand Four 
Hundred Twenty-Six and 94/100 Dollars ($8,426.94) as follows: 
a. Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eight and 98/100 Dollars ($2,808.98) on or before 
February 1, 1993; and 
b. Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eight and 98/100 Dollars ($2,808.98) on or before 
March 1, 1993; and 
c. Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eight and 98/100 Dollars ($2,808.98) on or before 
April 1, 1993. 
All payments shall be made to LSI at the following address: P.O. Box 9576, Ogden, Utah 84409. 
Payments hereunder shall be deemed made by Kudlik when actually received by LSI. Any payment 
hereunder or under the Lease which is not received by LSI on or before its due date shall not be timely 
made and shall constitute a breach. 
In the event that Kudlik foils to timely make any payment in full as due under this Agreement, 
LSI may make and declare, without any notice to Kudlik, the entire principal hereof and all other charges 
hereunder, whether or not then due, to be immediately due and payable forthwith and interest shall accrue 
APPENDIX B 
on the then entire outstanding principal amount hereof and all amounts due under the Lease at the rate 
of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date hereof until paid in full, both before and after 
judgment. Kudlik hereby expressly waives any defense, offset, recoupment, reduction and/or 
counterclaim and any right of defense, offset, recoupment, reduction and/or counterclaim for or on 
account of any reason or event whatsoever to any liability of Kudlik under this Agreement and/or the 
Lease. 
2. Lease Payments. Kudlik is also delinquent with respect to the January 1993 Lease 
payment. Kudlik shall pay to LSI the full amount of the January 1993 Lease payment of One Thousand 
Four Hundred Twenty-Eight and No/100 Dollars ($1,428.00) on or before February 1, 1993. Kudlik 
shall also pay to LSI the full amount of the February 1993 Lease payment of One Thousand Four 
Hundred Twenty-Eight and No/100 Dollars ($1,428.00) on or before February 10, 1993. Kudlik shall 
make all other payments which are or become owed under the Lease in full and on time. 
3. Event of Default. In the event that Kudlik fails to timely make any payment in full as 
due under this Agreement or the Lease or is otherwise in breach or default under the Lease, LSI may, 
without any notice to Kudlik and in addition to any other rights and remedies available to LSI under this 
Agreement, under the Lease, in equity or at law, immediately terminate the Lease and all of Kudlik's and 
his predecessors' rights thereunder. Any such termination shall be effective upon a declaration by LSI 
to that effect or upon LSFs sending to Kudlik a notice to that effect. 
4. Miscellaneous. 
a. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding between the 
parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all negotiations, representations, 
prior discussions and preliminary agreements between the parties hereto relating to the subject matter of 
this Agreement. This Agreement shall be interpreted and construed as if drafted and prepared by all 
parties hereto. 
b. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be deemed to have been executed in the State of 
Utah, and shall be interpreted, construed and enforced in accordance with and governed by the laws of 
the State of Utah, without giving effect to any conflict of laws provisions, and each party hereby submits 
to the exclusive personal jurisdiction of the courts situate in Ogden, Utah, with respect to any and all 
claims, demands or causes of action asserted or filed by any party against any other party relating to, or 
arising out of, the subject matter of this Agreement. 
c. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
parties and their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, legal representatives and assigns; provided, 
however, that Kudlik may not assign any of his rights or obligations hereunder or under the Lease 
without LSFs prior written consent. 
d. Waiver. Any waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any kind or character 
whatsoever by any other party, whether such waiver be direct or implied, shall not be construed as a 
continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent breach of this Agreement on the part of the other 
party. 
e. Severance Clause. The provisions of this Agreement are severable and should any 
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provision be void, voidable or unenforceable under any applicable law, such void, voidable or 
unenforceable provision shall not affect or invalidate any other provision of this Agreement, which shall 
continue to govern the relative rights and duties of the parties as though the void, voidable or 
unenforceable provision were not a part hereof. In addition, it is the intention and agreement of the 
parties that all of the terms and conditions hereof be enforced to the fullest extent permitted by law. 
f. Survival. All warranties, representations, indemnities, covenants and other agreements 
of the parties hereto shall survive the execution, delivery and termination of this Agreement. 
g. Attorneys Fees. If a legal action or other proceeding is brought for enforcement of this 
Agreement or because of an alleged dispute, breach, default or misrepresentation in connection with any 
of the provisions of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys 
fee (in-house or otherwise) and costs and expenses incurred, both before and after judgment, in addition 
to any other relief to which they may be entitled. 
h. Acknowledgement. Kudlik specifically represents and warrants to LSI that the statements 
set forth in the Background above are true and correct; Kudlik has had the opportunity to consult with 
independent legal counsel with respect to the advisability of executing this Agreement; and, in executing 
this Agreement, Kudlik does not rely on any inducements, promises or representations of LSI or any 
agent of LSI other than the terms and conditions specifically set forth in this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the day and year first 
set forth above. 
Living Scriptures, Inc., 
a Utah Corporation 
Bv: P^-W^- , SZL^A^P 
Its: S*r/r>p>2j-,s Micha^ijtJnn Kudlik, individually 
' and doing business as California Suds 
kudlik.agt 
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